Dejustification and Dispute Settlement: Irredentism in European Politics

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Irredentism developed into an anomaly in post-World War II Europe and — contradicting the dire predictions of the 1990s — has remained an anomaly even since the end of the Cold War. Focusing on the renunciation of the FRG's and the Republic of Ireland's irredentist claims, I propose a novel route to analyse dispute settlement. I contend that nations justify their stance in a conflict. In the case of irredentism, they do not merely assert that a disputed territory is their land but justify themselves and others why the disputed territory is rightfully theirs and why pursuing the irredentist stance is worthwhile. The disruption of this justification — what I call dejustification — constitutes a pathway to dispute settlement. Dejustification occurs through a change of the ideational environment that serves as the resource for justifying the claim and an advocacy that constructs a mismatch between environment and claim.

KEY WORDS ♦ advocacy ♦ argumentation ♦ border disputes ♦ conflict resolution ♦ irredentism

Introduction

Irredentist claims — here defined as claims of legal right to the territory of status quo states, aimed at retrieving what a claimant state regards as its ancestral homeland and/or its co-nationals — have greatly destabilized the international system since the advent of the nation-state. Irredentism is not only an issue that frequently escalates into armed conflict but also a type of conflict that is not easily resolved. Alsace-Lorraine fuelled the Franco–German rivalry for decades, Somalia only ceased to actively pursue its claim to Ethiopia's

Haud and Ogaden regions when it lost its *de facto* statehood, the situation along the Eritrean–Ethiopian border remains tense, Jammu and Kashmir have troubled the relations between Pakistan and India since the former split from the latter, and China's claim to Taiwan remains unresolved.

The European experience, however, shows that irredentist disputes are far from intractable. Whereas the few peaceful settlements of irredentist disputes prior to World War II were mere exceptions to the rule of enduring conflict, European states have shown a strong tendency to resolve their irredentist conflicts peacefully in the post-World War II era. The peaceful settlements occurred in three waves: The first wave started with Austria's recognition of the territorial status quo with Italy in 1969. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) recognized its borders with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, and the Soviet Union. Italy and Yugoslavia settled their dispute over Trieste in 1975. The second wave of settlements consisted of Greece's abandonment of its claims to Cyprus and Northern Epirus in Albania in the mid-1980s. The third wave witnessed the peaceful resolution of irredentist disputes between Estonia and Russia, Latvia and Russia, as well as the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom in the latter half of the 1990s. The fact that many new states emerged after the end of the Cold War — new states increase the potential for irredentism — makes the record of peaceful settlement even more remarkable.[1]

What explains this shift towards peaceful resolution? There are several possible pathways leading to the settlement of an irredentist dispute. My argument adds the process of dejustification to the literature on conflict resolution. I contend that irredentist nations do not merely assert that a disputed land is theirs and that it has to become theirs again but they also justify this assertion. This justification consists of two aspects: The legitimacy aspect explains to a claiming nation why the disputed land is rightfully part of its territory and the visionary aspect elaborates on how the disputed land can actually become part of the nation's territory again. My contention is that nations withdraw their irredentist claims if this justification unravels. I refer to the process of a justification's dismantling as dejustification. This process consists of two dimensions: First, the pool of taken-for-granted ideas from which the justification is taken changes. The reference repertoire that used to anchor the justification for irredentism is no longer dominant. Second, an advocacy persuades and sways the nation that there is no longer a match between the reshaped reference repertoire and the irredentist claim. The advocacy completes the disruption of the irredentist justification — and with it the irredentist claim itself. My in-depth research on the two most vigorous irredentist states in post-World War II Europe, the FRG and the Republic of Ireland, lends evidence to this contention.

This article is organized into four parts: First, I discuss the existing literature on irredentism. Second, I outline the process of dejustification. Third, I analyse the FRG's and the Republic of Ireland's renunciations of irredentism. Finally, the conclusion summarizes my findings and suggests an agenda for further research on dispute settlement through dejustification.

The Existing Literature and the Empirical Record

Despite its salience in world politics, irredentism has never generated much scholarly interest.[2] Aside from the small literature set that focuses on irredentism, research on ethnic conflict, territorial disputes and nationalism touches upon the dynamics of irredentist disputes. Explanations proposed by these clusters of the literature may be grouped according to their main *explanans*: Distribution of capabilities, utility maximization, and legitimacy. These three groups largely coincide with three influential perspectives on world politics: Realism, rational choice, and constructivism.

Albeit more concerned with war initiation than peaceful resolution, it is not difficult to extrapolate the seemingly intuitive hypothesis from realist scholarship on border disputes that the settlement of irredentist disputes is a function of military weakness (Gilpin, 1983; Huth, 1996). Weak states lack the means to expand. Thus, they give up their claims. There are, however, at least two problems with this proposition: First, among the most ardent irredentist states in pre-World War II Europe were many small states such as Albania (against Yugoslavia), Lithuania (against Poland), and Montenegro (against the Ottoman Empire). Second, it remains unclear why states such as Austria (versus Italy), the FRG (versus the Soviet Union) and the Republic of Ireland (versus the United Kingdom) made irredentist claims for decades before finally settling them, although they were persistently weaker than the status quo power.

Three strands of rational choice explanations are applicable to irredentism. First, the ethnic ties argument holds that elites are likely to engage in territorial conflict with the aim of retrieving ethnic kin from a status quo state if their remaining in power in the claimant state depends on the support of the same ethnic group, and if this support can be ensured by appealing to the ethno-nationalist sentiment of the group (Rothschild, 1981; Gagnon, 1994; Saideman, 1997). Second, the demographics argument postulates that ethnically homogenous states are more likely to be irredentist. In ethnically heterogeneous states, those groups who cannot relate to the irredentist claim become alienated and threaten the government's hold on power (Horowitz, 1985; Carment and James, 1997). Third, Birger Heldt (1999) applies a slightly modified version of the diversionary theory of war to a sample of territorial disputes. Elites escalate territorial disputes into war if this diverts from

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economic problems, and if the risks and the costs of the war — including the economic costs — do not exceed this benefit of escalation.

None of these explanations, however, can account for the pattern of dispute settlement in Europe. Demographics-based rational-choice explanations cannot explain why ethnically relatively homogenous states, such as Germany, Greece, and Italy, were not irredentism-prone across different time periods but ceased to be irredentist in the post-World War II era. The diversionary argument fails to explain why states, for instance Austria, Hungary and Spain, have pursued irredentist policies independently of economic fortunes. The ethnic ties argument overlooks irredentist claims that were not based on ethnicity, such as France's claim to Alsace-Lorraine and Yugoslavia's claim to Trieste, and it does not provide an answer to the important question why elites played the irredentist card to secure their grip on power in the past but have virtually ceased to do so after World War II.

There are three ideational explanations of irredentism: First, a number of scholars dichotomize nationalism into civic and ethnic. The latter, in contrast to the former, is seen as irredentism-prone (Kohn, 1962; Greenfeld and Chirot, 1994).[3] Second, Linden (2000) contends that identity-constituting norms associated with democracy make irredentism unlikely to occur. Third, Barkin and Cronin (1994) focus on the deep structure of international order. They contend that irredentism arises whenever national sovereignty dominates state sovereignty as the legitimizing principle of sovereignty, as laid down by major powers in a peace agreement following a hegemonic war.

Dichotomizing nationalisms, however, cannot account for the empirical record. Nations tending more towards the civic end of the identity spectrum, such as France and the Soviet Union, as well as nations tending more towards the ethnic pole, such as Romania and Hungary, made irredentist claims prior to World War II, and nations belonging to the latter category — for example the FRG, Estonia, Latvia — settled their irredentist disputes in the post-World War II era in the same manner as, say, the usually as civic nation categorized Yugoslavia did in 1975. The democratic norms hypothesis is equally problematic because it cannot explain why democratic and non-democratic states have made irredentist claims before 1939, and why democratic and non-democratic states have stopped being irredentist since 1945. Finally, the argument focusing on the legitimizing principle of sovereignty cannot account for the time period 1848–1914 when the number of irredentist disputes increased dramatically, although the post-Napoleonic order was founded on the principle of state sovereignty. Furthermore, Barkin and Cronin's prediction, based on their model, that post-Cold War world politics is reverting back to the age of irredentism due to a renewed shift to national sovereignty contradicts the empirical evidence. Irredentism has remained an anomaly in Europe even after 1989.

Dejustification: Legitimacy and Vision

The field of political geography has generated an important insight into the workings of irredentist disputes that remains neglected in policy-orientated studies. Actors justify irredentist claims to themselves and to others. They do not merely assert that a particular territory is their land but they provide elaborate justifications for this claim. Existing empirical evidence shows that this justification has two dimensions: The legitimacy dimension emphasizes that the irredentist nation has the right and, given its history, the obligation to retrieve the disputed territory from the status quo power. The visionary dimension shows the path to unification. The territorial claim is seen as anything but futile. It is backed up by expectations about how unity will be realized (Murphy, 1990; Paasi, 1996). *Hamas*, for example, has traditionally justified its claim to the whole of Israel to itself and others by telling a distorted story about the foundation of Israel and the series of Arab–Israeli conflicts. Portraying Israel as land-grabbing aggressor and the Palestinians as innocent victims expelled from their homeland, *Hamas* has justified its ultimate aim of driving Israel into the sea (legitimacy dimension). *Hamas*'s vision to do so further justifies the insistence on the irredentist stance. According to *Hamas*, the collapse of Israel is not merely an unattainable dream but a real possibility. The Palestinians would have to make Israel bleed and it would disappear from the Middle East in the same way as colonial powers once did (visionary dimension).

Taking the justification of irredentism seriously allows for the exploration of a novel explanation of the dynamics of irredentism. If justification really matters, the disruption of the justification — both its legitimacy and its visionary dimensions — should provide a route for settling irredentist disputes. Argumentation theory provides some vital clues about the process of such a dejustification (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958; Risse, 2000; Crawford, 2002). Argumentation involves two crucial factors: Reference repertoire and advocacy. The reference repertoire is a web of taken-for-granted ideas that provides the resources for justification. These resources have to be related to what is to be justified by an advocacy. Applied to the puzzle to be solved, this means that a withering away of the resources for justifying an irredentist claim coupled with a successful advocacy that constructs a mismatch between claim and reference repertoire should dismantle irredentism.

Hence, the task for this theoretical framework is twofold: Identification of a reference repertoire conducive to the settlement of an irredentist claim; and outline of the properties of an advocacy that is able to exploit such a facilitating repertoire. The following two sections deal with these tasks consecutively.

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Reference Repertoire Conducive to Dejustification

The aforementioned research by political geographers shows that the reference repertoire for justifying an irredentist claim is constituted by two key ideational forces, which this study conceptualizes as identity and episteme. Identity is a narrative category. By connecting events of past, present as well as desires and expectations about the future, it tells stories about Self and Other. These narratives are not objectively true or false, but they are intersubjectively plausible or implausible (Somers, 1994). Given the task at hand, Self is the irredentist nation and Other is the status quo nation. Their relationship may be depicted on a spectrum. On the one end of the spectrum is the exclusive identity variant. It tells a narrative that emphasizes the differences between Self and Other as well as the need to guard this difference. On the other pole of the spectrum is the inclusive identity variant. It stresses commonalities between Self and Other as well as the need to bridge existing differences. There are many different shades in between these two opposing poles. When Somalia claimed the Haud and Ogaden from Ethiopia in the 1980s, for instance, the dominant Somali identity representation vis-a-vis Ethiopia was close to the exclusive pole. It revolved around a narrative of victimization at the hands of Ethiopia.

The episteme is a particular conceptualization of a world view. World views matter because they enrich and impoverish at the same time: They are the lenses that enable us to see certain things but disable us from seeing others.[4] I define an episteme as a set of fundamental and taken-for-granted beliefs about what is (ontological dimension) and how what is is causally connected (causal dimension); on the basis of these beliefs social actors construct the world. For heuristic purposes, epistemes may also be located on a spectrum. The atomistic episteme is at the one end of the spectrum. It takes the division of the world into distinct nations for granted and explains the fortunes of nations with their degree of autonomy from others. Only autonomy — for which sovereign statehood is the prerequisite — enables the nation to preserve its authentic Self. At the other end of the spectrum is the communal episteme. It stresses the blurred nature of national boundaries and explains the fate of nations with their cross-national cooperation and exchanges. According to this logic, rigid nation-state borders breed international conflict whereas the permeation of these borders provides for international stability (see also Kratochwil et al., 1985). To return to the example of Somalia in the 1980s, Somali nation-builders and decision-makers took the atomistic episteme for granted. The creation of integrative structures across Somalia and Ethiopia to resolve the Haud and Ogaden problem was inconceivable to them. It seemed self-evident that being a nation required unambiguously defined state borders that follow the imaginary boundaries of the nation. Otherwise, the nation would be unable to safeguard its authentic self.

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This illustration from the Horn of Africa already hints at the significance of the reference repertoire for the solution of irredentist disputes. Exclusive identity and atomistic episteme are hindrances for dispute settlement. The more a dominant reference repertoire approaches the poles of inclusive identity and communal episteme, however, the more resources there are to dejustify an irredentist claim. Inclusive identity and communal episteme provide the tools to undermine the legitimacy dimension of irredentism. The identity narrative does not single out the status quo power as an enemy whose wrongs have to be avenged, but emphasizes what the nation has in common with the status quo power. Furthermore, inclusive identity and communal episteme provide many resources to target the visionary dimension of an irredentist justification. The inclusive identity does not call for the resolve never to waver in the struggle against the status quo power, but supports reconciliation and friendship. Additionally, the communal episteme makes annexation of land — the purpose of irredentism — an unintelligible solution to international problems because it revolves around the dissolution of nation-state borders.

Figure 1 illustrates the configuration of identity and episteme in a simplified but heuristically useful form. It distinguishes four categories of conduciveness for dejustification: The high category is closest to the intersection of communal episteme and inclusive identity. From this intersection point, the resources for dejustification gradually decline to the medium high, medium low and low categories.[5]

Advocacy and Reference Repertoire

Old habits die hard. A conducive reference repertoire does not automatically translate into the withdrawal of an irredentist claim. It takes an advocacy that actively builds the mismatch between claim and repertoire and that wins over relevant social actors. Winning over encompasses a mixture of persuasion and swaying but does not involve coercion. Some actors become persuaded by an argument. They embrace the message of an advocacy. Others remain unconvinced by the argument. They are not won over by the message but by the costs associated with opposing this message (Nölle-Neumann, 1980).[6]

Given varying degrees of conducive repertoires, what can advocacies against irredentism accomplish? I hypothesize that *low conduciveness hampers even attempts to merely articulate such an advocacy to a broader audience.* Actors who embrace a different reference repertoire may initiate an advocacy. But the dominance of the low conduciveness prevents a broader audience from taking the arguments advanced by advocates into consideration, not even to speak of them winning it over. Instead, the advocacy is much more likely to cause outrage. *Medium low conduciveness makes it possible for an advocacy to initiate a debate about irredentism but does not provide the resources necessary for winning*

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Figure 1
Conduciveness of reference repertoire to dejustification

over a broader audience. The medium low environment provides at least limited resources for dejustification. Thus, advocates attempting to dejustify the claim are less likely to be vilified as traitors and their arguments are less likely to be rejected outright. Yet there are not enough resources for an advocacy to spark a powerful campaign.

The medium high and high categories make a successful advocacy possible but provide different prospects for success. *The high category makes it possible for a top-down and a bottom-up advocacy to be successful.* The resources for disrupting the justification of the irredentist claim are so abundant that an advocacy even has the potential to win over a government. *The medium high category makes it possible for a top-down but not a bottom-up advocacy to be successful.* The medium high conduciveness provides fewer resources for dejustification than the high conduciveness, but the task for a top-bottom advocacy is easier. The advocates do not have to win over a government — the advocates are the government — and they tend to have more opportunities to influence other important social actors and the public than non-governmental

actors. Note that this is not a superfluous proposition. Even governments engage in advocacies to persuade the public of the course of action they opt for. With regard to irredentism, they are often compelled to do so by Constitutional provisions that require a broad consensus for the renunciation of the claim, sometimes even including popular referenda.

How do advocacies make use of the potential offered by a conducive repertoire and win over an audience? I hypothesize that *advocates with privileged access to public discourse persuade a broad audience by drawing upon the conducive reference repertoire to attack the legitimacy and the visionary dimensions of the irredentist justification*. The justification of an irredentist claim consists of the legitimacy and the visionary dimensions. Successful dejustification has to address both aspects in order to construct a mismatch between the reference repertoire and the irredentist claim.[7] Not every advocate has the means to do so. Advocates need to have the opportunity to make their voices heard. Influential actors, such as high-ranking politicians or leading journalists, have the means to channel their advocacy to a broad audience. Others, by contrast, may advocate very innovative and potentially important ideas but lack the means to affect public discourse.

As conducive as a repertoire may be, and as skillfully as powerful advocates may agitate against the justification of an irredentist claim, it is very rare that an argument persuades everyone. Yet the power of an argument is not confined to persuasion. I hypothesize that *those recalcitrant actors who share the conducive reference repertoire are nudged into compromising on their position if the advocacy is widely persuasive*. A successful advocacy puts pressure on recalcitrant actors to conform. Opposing a newly established majority view — perhaps even orthodoxy — is costly. This makes recalcitrant actors willing to compromise on their stance as long as this does not require them to violate their deepest-held beliefs. If they share the reference repertoire they do not have to act against these beliefs. Advocates and recalcitrant actors inhabit the same lifeworld. This makes it possible to bridge disagreements. Not much of the recalcitrant actors' position will be reflected in the compromise because they are, given the public pressure, very eager to reach a compromise. But the advocates and/or the status quo power have to agree to a minimum of concessions.

Comparing German and Irish Irredentism

Probing the plausibility of this theoretical framework requires an in-depth analysis. While it may be possible to translate the properties of the reference repertoire into indicators suitable for extensive research, the tracing of the advocacy necessitates a more intensive research design. In order for this empirical investigation to yield meaningful results, I select two cases that are, given the theoretical framework, at first glance rather puzzling. The FRG renounced

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its claims to the GDR as well as parts of Poland and the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War. The Republic of Ireland, by contrast, settled its dispute with the United Kingdom — a fellow member of the European Union — only a quarter of a century later. For a theoretical framework that takes the identification of nations vis-a-vis other nations seriously, these two cases allow for a demanding plausibility probe.

The FRG claimed that Germany in its 1938 borders — i.e. after the territorial revisions of the Versailles Treaty and before Hitler's expansionism — continued to exist *de jure*. Thus it refused to recognize the East German state (historical 'Central Germany') and the loss of Eastern Prussia, Pomerania and Upper Silesia (historical 'Eastern Germany') to Poland and the Soviet Union. There was a broad domestic consensus on irredentism until the mid-1960s. In the early 1970s, however, Bonn recognized the territorial status quo. The Unionists of Northern Ireland seized upon the opportunity offered by the 1921 Anglo–Irish Treaty and opted out of the Irish Free State. The 1937 Constitution of the Republic of Ireland codified the South's claim to Northern Ireland into law. More than half a century later, the Republic changed the Constitution and renounced its irredentist claim.

On a methodological note, I use the diffusion and congruence tests in order to identify the occurrence of persuasion. The diffusion test focuses on the spread of the argumentation against the justification of irredentism (legitimacy and visionary dimensions) from agent to agent. The reproduction of an argument serves as indicator for persuasion. This is based on the assumption that only the persuaded embrace an argument in its entirety. The congruence test, used when data — such as public opinion surveys — do not allow for the diffusion test, is slightly less demanding. If an audience (1) comes to accept the mismatch between episteme and identity on the one hand and the irredentist claim on the other, (2) this occurs after the initiation of an advocacy against irredentism, (3) the audience widely embraces the episteme and identity that serve as resources for the advocacy against irredentism, and (4) this acceptance develops without rewards and punishments being offered, I infer from this the occurrence of persuasion.

I use a sequencing test as indicator for swaying: At t_1 some players engage in a campaign to dejustify irredentism whereas others defend irredentism; the former and the latter do not share the same reference repertoire or, if they do, they disagree about the linkage between the reference repertoire and irredentism. Between t_1 and t_2, the costs for opposing dejustification are mounting. At t_2 the opponents receive a concession by the domestic advocates and/or in the international arena that makes the terms of forgoing irredentism, given the opponent's reference repertoire, less objectionable. At t_3 those opponents who share the advocates' reference repertoire cease their opposition without joining the advocacy for dejustification.

I analysed the irredentist debates from the time they were initiated to the time they were renounced (FRG: 1949–73; Republic of Ireland: 1921–98). In order to be able to examine the dynamics between elites and masses, my analysis relies on six clusters of sources: (1) speeches and writings of German chancellors and Irish *Taoisigh* (Prime Ministers); (2) parliamentary debates; (3) reactions to these debates in major newspapers;[8] (4) opinion polls; (5) fine arts, plays, films as well as fictional literature; and (6) elite interviews. What follows is a synopsis of my empirical findings.

The FRG's Reference Repertoire: Towards Medium High Conduciveness

How conducive was the West German reference repertoire for forgoing irredentism? After its total defeat in World War II, the FRG came to adopt — similarly to most of Western Europe — a communal episteme in the 1950s. In the West German reading, this episteme, often referred to as the Idea of Europe, had two dimensions: First, Europe consists of distinct nations but they are not autonomous from one another. Their fate is inescapably intertwined (ontological dimension). Second, Europe, divided by impenetrable nation-state borders, failed to acknowledge this shared fate in the past. This caused a history of warfare that culminated in two world wars and threatened Europe's very existence. The only way to overcome this history of destruction was to take away the divisiveness of Europe's nation-state borders. Europeans would have to cooperate and integrate in order to survive (causal dimension).

Foreign policy debates in the *Bundestag* were underpinned by the Idea of Europe from the very beginning in 1949.[9] All major West German newspapers took the Idea of Europe as the taken-for-granted lens to make sense of European affairs (Kiefer, 1993). The public followed the lead of the elites by the mid-1950s. In 1949, West Germans still thought that nation-statehood would provide 'a happier future' for Europe than a unified Europe. From 1950 onwards, the margin between those in favor of nation-statehood and those rejecting it grew steadily. By 1966, when Emnid asked the question for the last time, two-thirds expressed the opinion that European unity would provide 'a happier future' for Europe than the nation-state (Eberlein, 1968).

While the episteme remained largely unaltered from the 1950s onwards, the identity narrative changed significantly. Ashamed of Germany's past, West Germans embraced what appeared to them a European identity. Before the mid-1960s, however, the FRG's European identity was really a West European identity. Based on three dichotomies, West Germans sought sharp demarcation from the East: First, West Germans portrayed themselves and Western Europe as peace-loving and Eastern Europe, in particular the Soviet Union, as a menace that had learnt nothing from the lessons of two world

wars. Moscow was accused of continuing the policy of territorial aggrandizement that had caused so much havoc in Europe's past. In this context, the Soviet Union was often compared to Nazi-Germany and Stalin was equated with Hitler (Adenauer, 1975; Dönhoff, 1953). Second, the FRG defined itself and the West as freedom-loving and juxtaposed this with the East European governments' subjugation of their own people. There was democracy and the respect for human rights west of the Iron Curtain. To its east, it was alleged, a ruling clique of criminals denied virtually all fundamental rights to people (*Deutscher Bundestag*, 1972). Third, West Germans saw themselves as part of the *Abendland* (occident). They constructed a history spanning from ancient Greece and Rome to contemporary democracy, cooperation and integration in Western Europe. Eastern Europe, by contrast, was perceived to be outside of this community. Adenauer even denied Eastern Europe the seal of approval 'Europe'. As he put it, 'Asia stands at the Elbe River' (quoted in Altmann, 1993: 33).

Between 1956 and 1964, West German identity came to move away from the exclusive end of the spectrum closer to its middle through a process characterized by many ups and downs. The freedom versus slavery dichotomy continued to be an important reference point to position Western Europe vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. A series of events entrenched this aspect of the FRG's identity: The Soviet Union's crushing of the uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 as well as the Berlin Wall, built in 1961. The other two dichotomies, however, lost their sharpness. When Adenauer retired as chancellor in 1963, the *Abendland*–Asia dichotomy, even in the 1950s the weakest of the four dichotomies, lost its main protagonist and ceased to play a significant role. The peace-loving versus menace dichotomy did not lose as much of its significance as the *Abendland* discourse did but the juxtaposition became less pronounced. This was related to the FRG's perceptions of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, which replaced Lenin's doctrine of the inevitability of war between capitalist and communist states with the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in Europe, the call for a pan-European dialogue by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1958, and the elaboration of a collective security system across the East–West divide by Władysław Gomułka, the leader of Poland's Communist Party, six years later.

Amid two successive Berlin crises, the FRG initially hardly reacted to the re-positioning of the Warsaw Pact. Gomułka's proposals, however, helped to lessen the juxtaposition between the peace-loving West and the menacing East. Newspaper editorials argued vehemently against too strong a demarcation from the East (Proebst, 1966; Tern, 1966). *Bundestag* debates echoed this reshaped identity representation. Being too starkly anti-Soviet, especially when based on the portrayal of the Soviet Union as a peace-threatening menace, came to be

seen as anachronistic.[10] The lessoning of the demarcation left room for the FRG to redefine its role in Europe. It came to see itself as the bridge-builder between East and West. Newspaper editorials described West Germany's role with this metaphor (Birnbaum, 1966; Tern, 1966; Zundel, 1967). Speeches in the *Bundestag* addressed the 'desire for a real partnership' across the East–West divide (Stücklen, 1968: 10116). Chancellor Kiesinger (1967) even identified friendship as the ultimate goal. Public opinion concurred. In 1971 and 1972, Emnid (1948–1973) asked the question whether West Germany should seek to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union and to create, if possible, a friendship. The public overwhelmingly endorsed this desire: 78% were in favor in August 1971. This figure increased to 83% by February 1972.

Dejustification in the FRG: Successful Top-down Advocacy

Hence, episteme and identity constituted a reference repertoire whose conduciveness for an anti-irredentist advocacy had become medium high by the mid-1960s. The dominant identity had moved from close to the exclusive pole towards the middle of the spectrum. The episteme was much closer to the communal than the atomistic end of the spectrum. What difference did the evolution of this repertoire make? How did it facilitate or hamper advocacies against irredentism?

Prior to the late 1950s, advocates for forgoing irredentism, such as Max Reimann (1949), were vilified as traitors. Yet when the identity started to slowly move away from the exclusive pole in the late 1950s, it became possible to articulate an argument for the maintenance of existing borders. In 1958, the influential historian Golo Mann (1963) argued against the legitimacy of the territorial claim. He contended that Germany's territorial revisionism was diametrically opposed to the role of a conciliatory and bridge-building state that, bearing in mind its past, it ought to play in Europe. He also argued forcefully against the dominant vision of unification. Given the lessons of the past, the goal could not be to move Germany's border further towards the east but to overcome the divisiveness of borders separating European nations: Germany ought to contribute to a new order, 'under which political borders increasingly lose their evil significance; break out of the cursed cycle of wars, mutual expulsions and torture'. In 1960, Karl Jaspers (1969) further elaborated on the argument against the dominant vision for German reunification. He contended that replacing the rigidity of nation-state borders with a process of ever increasing cooperation and integration in Europe as a whole would eventually offer a chance for German reunification. The polity making this reunification possible would not be the nation-state but a unified Europe.

Initially, there was very little reaction to this dismantling of the justification of irredentism. From 1962 onwards, however, a powerful advocacy formed

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around Willy Brandt, then mayor of West Berlin. Supported by his circle of advisors, Egon Bahr, Klaus Schütz and Heinrich Albertz, Brandt dared to follow Jaspers' and Mann's reasoning on unification. Initially unsure about the potential of the advocacy to resonate with a broader audience, Brandt carefully introduced his arguments. Brandt's aides, in particular Bahr and Schütz, tested out the waters. If Brandt deemed them sufficiently safe, he publicly joined the advocacy.

The advocacy persuaded more and more influential actors. The Liberal Democrats, the junior partner of the governing Christian Democrats, ceased to postulate the reunification of Germany in the borders of 1937. The Social Democrats — Brandt became their leader in 1964 — were also, in principle, prepared to recognize the existing borders. Memoranda by the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) and the Bensberger Kreis, a group of leading members of the Catholic Church, concurred. Some leading journalists, such as Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, Rudolf Augstein and Sebastian Haffner, called for the recognition of the territorial status quo (Roth, 1995: 59). The argument for recognition consistently echoed Mann's and Jaspers' persuasions: First, claiming territory contradicted the role that the FRG ought to play in Europe. Bonn ought to bring East and West closer together. Claiming territory, by contrast, made building bridges impossible. Thus, irredentism lacked legitimacy. Second, recognition would set in motion an evolution towards overcoming the divisiveness of Europe's borders. Eventually, this would offer a chance for German unification outside the container of the nation-state.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the advocacy persuaded the majority of the public. Prior to 1969, the majority opposed recognition. In 1969, there were as many people in favor as against the recognition of the German–Polish border. From 1970 onwards, a majority of West Germans supported its recognition (Glaab, 2000: 45). In October 1970, an equal percentage of West Germans backed and opposed the recognition of East Germany as a state. From 1971 to 1973, approximately two-thirds favored recognition. In 1970, over 80% of West Germans supported entering negotiations with the GDR, whereas less than 10% were opposed (Glaab, 1999: 260–76).

In 1966, the Social Democrats became the junior partner of a Christian Democrat-led coalition government. The advocates of recognition had gained access to the corridors of power. In 1969, Brandt was elected Chancellor and started to lead a coalition government with the Free Democrats. Bahr remained his closest advisor. Despite sharp criticism by the Christian Democrats, the newly elected coalition pushed its agenda forward very quickly. In August 1970, the FRG and the Soviet Union signed the Moscow Treaty. Four months later, the FRG and Poland signed the Warsaw Treaty. In these treaties, Bonn renounced its claims to former Eastern Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia. In December 1972, the two Germanies signed the Basic Treaty, in

which they agreed that they were two separate states whose relations were governed by the United Nations Charter.

The Christian Democrats harshly criticized the government for signing these treaties. Most Christian Democrats — in contrast to the Christian Social Union, their Bavarian sister party — shared the FRG's self-definition as bridge-builder. They also agreed that only gradually overcoming the divisiveness of nation-state borders offered a chance for German reunification. Thus, they shared the dominant episteme and identity. But they were not persuaded that this reference repertoire demanded the recognition of the territorial status quo (Pridham, 1975; Barzel, 1998). The more the public opinion pressure mounted, however, the stronger became the signals that the Christian Democrats would compromise on their position. Throughout the 1960s, the party had lost more and more votes. In 1969, it was elected out of power for the first time in the Bonn Republic. In the early 1970s, its chairman, Rainer Barzel, called for negotiations with the government about the interpretation of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. The government made several concessions. Bonn clarified in unequivocal language that it recognized the existing borders merely provisionally. Only a formal agreement among the four former occupying powers France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States could determine Germany's final borders and the FRG would continue to aspire to a peaceful reunification.

Poland and the Soviet Union accepted this interpretation. Given this concession, the leader of the Christian Democrats, Rainer Barzel, and with him most of his party, were even prepared to vote in favor of ratification but were nudged by the Christian Social Union to abstain from the vote (Barzel, 1998). Had the opposition voted against the treaty, it would have blocked the ratification because a number of deputies, protesting against the treaties, had changed from the Liberal and Social Democrats to the Christian Democrats. The pattern of the ratification of the Basic Treaty was similar. The opposition voiced its disapproval but stopped short of blocking ratification. Due to its peculiar nature, the treaty required the ratification of the second chamber of Parliament, the *Bundesrat*. The Christian Democrats used their majority in this chamber to vote against the treaty but — in a historically unique move — did not send the treaty to the arbitration panel of *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*. Thus, the *Bundesrat* did not formally reject the ratification of the treaty.

The Republic of Ireland's Reference Repertoire: Towards High Conduciveness

How conducive was the Irish reference repertoire for forgoing irredentism? From the early 1920s to the late 1950s, the episteme was close to the atomistic

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end of the spectrum. The atomism was an unquestioned orthodoxy for the three arguably most important figures in early independent Ireland: The celebrated poet William Butler Yeats (1990), the long-time *Taoiseach* and author of the Constitution Eamon de Valera (1980), and the Republic's first President Douglas Hyde (1986). They took the ontological belief for granted that the world has always been carved up into ancient and homogenous nations. The geographical boundaries of these nations were presumed to be clearly identifiable for everyone by objective markers such as natural barriers (seas, rivers, mountains) and the shared physiognomy of the members of a nation. Woven into these ontological orthodoxies were two causal dogmas: Nations require a maximum of autonomy from other nations in order to preserve their authentic Self. Only if they preserve their authentic Self can they flourish.

From the 1940s to the 1980s, a much more communal episteme gained increasing influence. While in office as foreign minister, Seán MacBride learned the Idea of Europe at numerous meetings at the Council of Europe in the late 1940s. As interpreted by MacBride (1949), the Idea was diametrically opposed to the dominant atomistic episteme. He took for granted that it was precisely the false assumption of natural borders and homogenous nations, accompanied by attempts to reach a maximum of autonomy from other nations, that had caused a series of disasters in Europe. Only replacing Europe's splintering into nation-states with cooperation and integration as well as the acknowledgement of the plurality of nations would make it possible to achieve a lasting peace.

Throughout the Republic's application process to the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s, the Idea of Europe gained increasing support among elites. By the 1980s, two of the Republic's three most influential political parties, *Fine Gael* and *Labour*, had firmly embraced the Idea of Europe (Goodman, 1996: 200–1). *Fianna Fáil*, the Republic's most powerful political party, followed in the early 1990s (Reynolds, 1993; Ahern, 1993). In an uncontroversial debate, the *Dáil* agreed on its first White Paper on foreign policy in 1996. The document is explicitly underwritten by the Idea of Europe (Government of Ireland, 1996). A 1991 opinion poll survey, in which a remarkable 60% expressed a desire to join a United States of Europe, suggests a strong indirect measure for the weakness of the atomistic and the strength of the communal episteme.[11]

The Republic's dominant identity changed as dramatically as its dominant episteme. From the 1920s to the 1970s, the Republic's identity vis-a-vis Unionists and Britain was squarely on the exclusive side of the spectrum. The Republic cherished its Celtic and Catholic representations of Irishness. This Irishness was exclusive in two ways: First, the Republic sought sharp demarcation from other nations, in particular Britain. Intermingling with other nations was seen as a threat to Irishness (Fanning, 1990: 9–10). Second, the dominant representation of Irishness did not leave room for those who did

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not share it. Among these were the Unionists of the North. Resolute action would have to be taken against those aligning themselves with Britain: In the words of Thomas O'Higgins (1948), Unionists would have to be 'cured of the mental aberration that instigates them to look outside their own country for leadership'. Under no circumstances would the Irish nation accommodate Unionist aspirations.

While the exclusive identity representation came to be somewhat discredited with the onset of large-scale violence in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, the decisive shift occurred in the 1980s. When in office as *Taoiseach* in the early 1980s, Garret FitzGerald vigorously attempted to make Irishness more inclusive. He wanted to 'lead a republican crusade', which was directed at putting an end to the demarcation of Irishness from Unionism. This crusade was complemented by a positive identification with Europe. The immediate results of the crusade were mixed but, from the mid-1980s onwards, Irishness moved significantly towards the inclusive end of the identity spectrum. Irish films ridiculed and criticized the myth of an ancient and homogenous Gaelic nation (Quinn, 1983; Jordan, 1992). Fictional literature echoed the dismantling of the exclusive identity (Mac Laverty, 1983; Patterson, 1988). In the *Dáil*, the inclusive identity became a virtually unquestioned orthodoxy in the early 1990s, when the guardian of de Valera's ideals, Charles Haughey, retired as *Taoiseach* and leader of *Fianna Fáil*.

Dejustification in the Republic of Ireland: Successful Bottom-up Advocacy

By the early 1990s, episteme and identity constituted a highly conducive environment for forgoing irredentism. The dominant episteme had moved from close to the atomistic pole far towards the communal pole of the continuum. The dominant identity was transformed in equally dramatic fashion. While Irishness approached the exclusive end of the spectrum in the 1920s and moved from there only slowly towards the middle in the 1960s and 1970s, it was situated quite close to the inclusive end of the spectrum in the 1990s. What repercussions did the evolution of this reference repertoire have for advocacies against irredentism?

For the early 20th century re-inventors of Irishness, the irredentist claim to Northern Ireland was an article of faith in the Nationalist credo. Those Irish leaders who signed the Anglo–Irish Treaty in 1921, which provided Northern Ireland with the option to remain part of the United Kingdom, came to be vilified as traitors. Those opposing the treaty became the heroes of the Irish Free State and later the Republic. The colonial episteme and the identity narrative firmly anchored the irredentist claim. Britain's exercise of sovereignty over Northern Ireland was seen as greatly unjust. From a Nationalist perspective,

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Britain mutilated Ireland by continuing to hold on to the colonization of its Northern counties (Bowman, 1982: 301). Furthermore, Nationalists invoked the freedom struggle of generations of Irish people. The narrative told a story of heroes who, due to their endurance and sacrifices, eventually managed to free most of Ireland from British colonialism. If the present generation would uphold this dedication, Britain would withdraw from the North as well (Costello, 1948; Lehane, 1948).

The advocacy to recognize the existing border began only in the early 1970s. The two key advocates were Garret FitzGerald (1972) and Conor Cruise O'Brien (1972), both influential journalists and politicians. They argued vehemently against the legitimacy of the justification of the irredentist claim. In their view, the Republic was as much to blame for partition as Britain. In the 20th century, the majority (Nationalists) had tried to impose its conception of Irishness onto the minority (Unionists). The irredentist claim was the manifest expression of this attempt. As a consequence, the minority felt threatened. Out of legitimate fear, it opted out of Ireland and was determined to hold onto its autonomy from Dublin by any means possible, including a *de facto* civil war in the North. Additionally, FitzGerald also attacked the visionary dimension. In his view, a chance for reunification could only be kept alive if North and South embarked on a cooperation and integration scheme modelled after the European unification process. The irredentist claim was a stumbling block making such a process impossible to initiate. Borders would first have to be recognized in order to be later overcome through a historical process.

Amidst the dominant medium low conduciveness of the reference repertoire in the 1970s, the advocates were not vilified as traitors but had only limited success in persuading more actors. Only a small number of *Dáil* deputies were persuaded by the new thinking (Burke, 1971; O'Leary, 1972; Carter, 1974). FitzGerald's and O'Brien's reasoning was informed by a degree of inclusive identity and communal episteme that most social actors had not come to share yet. The more dominant the inclusive identity and the communal episteme became over time, however, the more the advocacy resonated with a broader audience. By the late 1980s, *Fianna Fáil* was the only major political party to uphold the irredentist claim. Among the three major newspapers, only the *Irish Press* defended *Fianna Fáil*'s stance. The *Irish Independent* and the *Irish Times* were very critical of the Republic's claim of legal right to Northern Ireland.[12]

The available public opinion data show that the argumentation against irredentism began to resonate with the public in the early 1990s. In 1981, almost half of the populace was still opposed to changing the irredentist Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution.[13] In 1992, there was a majority in favor of amendment for the first time: 41% wished the territorial claim to be replaced by an

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aspiration for unity, whereas 39% rejected this option.[14] In 1993, the margin between those in favor of amendment and those against increased to 7%; 39% preferred amendment while 32% were opposed.[15] By 1995, the support for amendment had increased by more than 20%. Sixty percent opted for Articles 2 and 3 expressing an aspiration, and only 20% wanted to retain the *de jure* claim.[16] This remarkable shift in public opinion occurred years before the Good Friday Agreement offered tangible benefits to the Republic and the Nationalists of Northern Ireland.

Fianna Fáil and the *Irish Press* remained unconvinced. Yet the public opinion shift in favor of recognition put considerable pressure on the recalcitrant actors. Before the 1970s, *Fianna Fáil* majority governments were only rarely interrupted by coalition governments headed by *Fine Gael*. From the 1970s onwards, however, *Fianna Fáil* found it increasingly difficult to form a government — even with the help of a coalition partner. The guardian of de Valera's ideals lost the close link to the populace that de Valera had claimed precisely because it held on to these ideals, symbolized in many ways by the irredentist claim. From 1993 onwards, when the public opinion shift on recognition had become consolidated, *Fianna Fáil* became increasingly cautious to formulate its opposition to recognition. It perceived — as the *Irish Press*, *Fianna Fáil*'s close ally put it — 'a sense of urgency to match the public mood'.[17] The successful advocacy inflicted heavy costs on recalcitrant actors. Holding on to the old reference repertoire, *Independent Fianna Fáil* did not bend. It had not come to embrace the new reference repertoire. *Fianna Fáil*, by contrast, having adopted the Idea of Europe and the inclusive identity representation, started to bow to the pressure. The party hardly voiced any criticism to the *Fine Gael* government's announcement to withdraw the irredentist claim in the Framework Agreement with the United Kingdom and the Northern Irish parties in 1995.

With the help of its coalition partner, the Progressive Democrats, *Fianna Fáil* came back to power in 1997. The new government soon realized that the United Kingdom and the Unionists of Northern Ireland offered a comprehensive package with many benefits for the Republic and the Nationalists in Northern Ireland. A Council of Ireland would be set up. The Council would discuss matters of relevance to both parts of Ireland. Nationalists had long expressed the hope that such an institution could be the nucleus of an all-Ireland government. Furthermore, Nationalists in the North would participate in a power-sharing executive. In exchange for these benefits, the Republic would have to forgo irredentism. Given the pressure of public opinion, this was a compromise that *Fianna Fáil* was ready to accept. The *Taoiseach* Bertie Ahern and his Foreign Minister David Andrews toured the country and won over their party in numerous meetings.[18]

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In 1998, Ahern signed the Good Friday Agreement. In the accord, the Republic announced that it would hold a referendum on replacing the territorial claim in Articles 2 and 3 with an aspiration. An impressive majority of 94% carried the referendum.[19] The enactment of this article ended the 51-year-old irredentist claim.

Conclusion

Dejustification provides a plausible explanation for the process through which the FRG and the Republic of Ireland came to renounce their irredentist claims. In both cases, domestic advocacies dismantled the justification on which irredentism was based in two ideal-typical stages: They first persuaded a broad audience that irredentism had lost its legitimacy and that the vision for reunification around which irredentism revolved had become obsolete. Then, those recalcitrant actors who shared the advocates' reference repertoire were swayed into compliance by the mounting costs of opposing the majority view that the advocates' persuasion efforts had created. The shared reference repertoire made it possible for recalcitrant actors to bend without violating their deepest held beliefs.

The conduciveness of the reference repertoire affected the chances for the advocacy to win over potential persuadees. When the conduciveness was low, the target audience reacted with outrage against anti-irredentist advocacies. Medium low conduciveness made it possible for advocates to articulate their advocacy more freely but did not provide sufficient resources for the advocacy to win over a broader audience. Medium high conduciveness offered an opportunity for German advocates to win over the public and most influential social actors through a top-down advocacy. Advocates, having the advantage of government responsibility for seven years during their campaign, succeeded in fully using the potential that the medium high conduciveness offered to them. When the environment was medium high in the Republic of Ireland, an outspoken defender of the anti-irredentist campaign was in power and the advocacy was unable to win over the government. Yet about a decade later, when the environment had become highly conducive to forgoing irredentism, the advocacy even managed to win over a recalcitrant government.

The empirical results of this study illustrate that the process of dejustification provides a two-fold added value to existing accounts of conflict resolution: First, dejustification addresses in detail the ideational environment that makes the settlement of disputes possible. The Realist hypothesis, suggested in various studies on the German and Irish cases, that the claimant withdrew its territorial claim because of the impossibility of retrieving the lost lands from a greater power correctly focuses on the feasibility of unification. A vision for unity is part of every justification of an irredentist claim and, therefore, is

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critical for dejustification. The vision of feasibility, however, is by no means determined by material capabilities as realist scholarship on the two cases assumes (Griffith, 1982; Skelly, 1997).[20] If it were, neither Bonn nor Dublin would ever have claimed territory from the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, respectively. Ideas, in the case of irredentism especially the episteme, critically shape the vision for unification and with it the dejustification of a conflict. Rational choice accounts also point in some respects in the right direction. Some domestic actors opt for settling an international dispute because of the benefits that this settlement entails. As the German and Irish cases illustrate, however, this is merely part of the story. Rational choice explanations miss the full story because they downplay the role of ideas.[21] Given the taken-for-granted ideas that some actors embrace, they engage in what is initially often a costly advocacy. Given these ideas, some become persuaded by the advocacy and others do not. And given these ideas, some of those who are not persuaded bend to the costs of their recalcitrance while others do not. Constructivist accounts focus on ideas but tend to narrowly conceptualize them as identity and its constituting norms (Girvin, 1994; Howe, 2000). It is somewhat startling that constructivists widely share the rationalists' neglect of world views. Much of what is now labeled Constructivism has been inspired by the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966). The world view ('*Weltansicht*') is a key ideational force for the latter (Luckmann, 1991: 91–3). The episteme is such a world view and has profound repercussions for the settlement of irredentist disputes.

Second, the process of dejustification adds the logic of argumentation to the study of conflict resolution. Research on international security echoes the logics of action outlined by March and Olsen (1989). Some conflict dynamics are dominated by the conflict party's calculation of costs and benefits (logic of consequences). Others are fundamentally shaped by the norm conformity of the actors involved (logic of appropriateness). There are, however, at least two more important — but unfortunately neglected — logics of action: Pierre Bourdieu's logic of practice revolves around the habitus. Past practices help to generate deeply internalized dispositions, which in turn generate similar practices (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). While the episteme, as defined in this study, is an ideational force that points to the logic of practice, swaying alludes to the salience of the logic of consequences, and persuasion shows traces of the logic of appropriateness, most of the key elements of the process of dejustification may be classified under the logic of argumentation (Habermas, 1995; Risse, 2000). No matter whether primarily empirically or normatively orientated, what is common to any argumentative logic is that actors reason about a particular issue by constructing a link between taken-for-granted beliefs — often referred to as shared lifeworld and here as reference repertoire — and this issue, and that they come to construct this linkage

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through persuasion. With argumentation still too easily dismissed as inconsequential talk, research on argumentation and international security remains rare.[22] The two cases under scrutiny here caution against this neglect. Without successful argumentation neither Bonn nor Dublin would have revoked its irredentist claims. It is no coincidence that the FRG renounced their irredentism only in the early 1970s although dominant representations of identity and episteme had shifted in the mid-1960s, and that the Republic of Ireland withdrew its irredentist claim only in the late 1990s although the dominant reference repertoire had shifted in the early 1990s. It took a successful advocacy to establish the link between the favorable reference repertoire and the anti-irredentist stance.

This study has merely begun to explore the nexus of dejustification and conflict resolution. Many important questions remain. Four seem of particular importance: First, *how generalizable are the findings?* Dejustification provides a compelling explanation for a puzzle within the puzzle. Within the question of why European states, in sharp contrast to the past, have strongly tended to settle their irredentist disputes peacefully since the end of World War II, I focused on the question of why the FRG renounced its claims much earlier than the Republic of Ireland did although the Cold War context posed an additional hindrance for dispute settlement in the former case that was absent in the latter. Only more empirical research can demonstrate whether dejustification can account for the resolution or persistence of other irredentist disputes in Europe (with the Balkans constituting an important set of cases) and beyond (with the Middle East assuming high priority for research), and, more generally, can delineate which kinds of conflict can be settled through dejustification. Second, *what reference repertoire makes what type of conflict amenable to resolution?* This article was concerned with irredentism, which revolves around the imagination of the boundaries of the nation. For this particular type of conflict, ideational forces in general as well as episteme and identity in particular are important points of reference. Yet other forces may play important roles in other types of conflict. Third, *how do advocacies affect one another?* There is some evidence in the cases under scrutiny that the Irish advocates were to some extent informed by the German advocacy (Reynolds, 1990). A closer examination of these interaction patterns — imitation, learning, and persuasion come to mind — is warranted. Additionally, there is no reason to assume that every advocacy takes place within the confines of the nation-state container. Transnational advocacies should play an important role in a globalizing world. Fourth, *what explains the change of the reference repertoire?* The purpose of this study was to trace the process through which agents construct linkages between what they take for granted and the settlement of an international dispute. In order to be able to focus on this linkage, I merely described the evolution of the reference repertoire but did not inquire into the processes that drive this

evolution.[23] Yet the interesting question remains how something as enduring as an identity narrative and an episteme come to change. Elaborating on Campbell (2004: 62–85), three ideal-typical processes are well worth exploring. Agents may change the repertoire by rearranging its already constitutive components (*bricolage*), replace some aspects of the repertoire with new aspects (translation), or institutionalize an entirely new repertoire (revolution). The two cases at hand provide some clues. Perhaps most importantly, epistemic change seems to be associated with the ideal-type of revolutionary change. In both cases, epistemic change towards the Idea of Europe rendered the established exclusive identity narrative unintelligible and made the imagination of a more inclusive identity possible.[24] Epistemic change makes for a radical break from the past because it closes a set of possibilities to imagine the world and opens a new one.

Notes

1. There are only four cases that did not follow this pattern: Romania withdrew its claim to Transylvania in 1947, and Spain versus the United Kingdom (Gibraltar) as well as Armenia versus Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabach) are ongoing irredentist disputes. Additionally, the Serb leadership around Slobodan Milošević pursued (somewhat thinly disguised) irredentist policies during the break-down of Yugoslavia.
2. Most of the small literature set developed in the 1990s amid fears that Europe's future may resemble its past (Chazan, 1991; Carment and James, 1995; Saideman, 1998; Ambrosio, 2001). There were two earlier important contributions (Weiner, 1971; Horowitz, 1985).
3. In a similar vein, Stephen van Evera (1994) distinguishes between diaspora-annexing and diaspora-accepting nationalisms, and Ambrosio (2001) between levels of territorial-nationalist sentiment.
4. There is agreement across the Rationalist–Constructivist divide that world views, albeit neglected in scholarly research, matter in world politics (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Laffey and Weldes, 1997). Coined by Foucault (1970) and introduced to the study of world politics by John Ruggie (1975), a small set of literature on the epistemic dimension of world politics has developed on which I base my conceptualization (Adler and Haas, 1992; Ruggie, 1993; Legro, 2000).
5. Episteme and identity are not independent variables causing the repertoire but they — intertwined in a number of possible ways — constitute the reference repertoire.
6. I elaborate on this mechanism of winning over elsewhere (Kornprobst, 2007).
7. The framing literature would formulate that the advocacy has to be framed in a way that dismantles both dimensions of the irredentist justification. Note, however, that

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the framing literature usually does not address the background from which advocates pick the ideas for their advocacy (for an exception, see Williams and Kubal, 1999). This study, by contrast, conceptualizes the background as reference repertoire.

8. I selected Parliamentary debates that dealt with either general principles of foreign policy or the disputed territories or both. Then I analysed the reactions to these debates in the two editions following the debate in the claimant's major national newspapers (West Germany: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Welt*, *Zeit*; Republic of Ireland: *Irish Independent*, *Irish Press*, and *Irish Times*).

9. With the exception of small splinter groups at the right and left margins, this consensus held across party lines (Ewers, 1949: 47; Henle, 1949: 96; Schäfer, 1949: 51; Adenauer, 1965: 312).

10. There was agreement on this issue across party lines (Wehner, 1966: 2953; Genscher, 1968: 8337; Kiesinger, 1968: 8169).

11. In 1984, two-thirds were still opposed. MRBI survey, 6–12 March 1984 (MRBI/3265/84) and IMS survey, 5–7 December 1991 (CMC/mcJ.1S393).

12. See especially *Irish Independent*, 20 November 1985, p. 12; *Irish Independent*, 23 November 1985, p. 8; *Irish Times*, 22 November 1985, p. 9.

13. IMS survey, 14–15 October 1981 (j.8041).

14. MRBI survey, 24–25 September 1992 (MRBI/4080/92).

15. IMS survey, 1–8 April 1993 (CMC/1d/j.3S125).

16. MRBI survey, 20–22 May 1995 (MRBI/4290/95).

17. *Irish Press*, 2 April 1993, p. 8.

18. Interview with David Andrews in Dublin, 29 January 2004.

19. http://www.electionsireland.org.

20. Scholarship on asymmetric war (Paul, 1994) partly embraces such a broader notion. In addition to the focus on the distribution of capabilities between claimant and status quo state, research on the German case frequently focuses on Germany's allies (Haftendorn, 1985; Hacke, 1988). Yet the contention that Bonn renounced its territorial claims due to the pressure of its allies is problematic because Bonn went so much beyond its allies' desire for détente that Ostpolitik reawakened their Rapallo complex, i.e. the fear of a Soviet–German rapprochement at the expense of the West (Steffens, 1989).

21. Due to their neglect of the ideational dimension, rational choice explanations of the German and Irish cases lack the analytical categories necessary to address successful argumentation and its connection to swaying. Eunan O'Halpin (1999), for example, provides a theoretical framework that helps to explain swaying but not how argumentation came to pressure recalcitrant actors to such an extent that those who shared the advocates' reference repertoire gave up their opposition.

22. For an important exception, see Risse (2000). Furthermore, some of the advocacy literature touches upon security issues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999).

23. It is possible to maintain this focus because advocates for conflict resolution are not able to single-handedly change an identity narrative — not even to speak of an episteme — in order to make it more supportive of their advocacy.

24. The literature on nations and nationalism elaborates on this linkage (Smith, 1979; Cruz, 2000; Kornprobst, 2005).

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